Both in research on Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVHs) and in their clinical assessment, it is common to distinguish between voices that are experienced as ‘inner’ (or ‘internal’, ‘inside the head’, ‘inside the mind’,...) and voices that are experienced as ‘outer’ (‘external’, ‘outside the head’, ‘outside the mind’,...). This inner/outer-contrast is treated not only as an important phenomenological variable of AVHs, it is also often seen as having diagnostic value. In this article, we argue that the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ (...) voices is ambiguous between different readings, and that lack of disambiguation in this regard has led to flaws in assessment tools, diagnostic debates and empirical studies. Such flaws, we argue furthermore, are often linked to misreadings of inner/outer-terminology in relevant 19th and early twentieth century work on AVHs, in particular, in connection with Kandinsky’s and Jaspers’s distinction between hallucinations and pseudo-hallucinations. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00536-7.

Zawiera wybór pism Jana Amosa Komeńskiego.

This paper examines the place of metaphorical interpretation in the current Contextualist‐Literalist controversy over the role of context in the determination of truth‐conditions in general. Although there has been considerable discussion of ‘non‐literal’ language by both sides of this dispute, the language analyzed involves either so‐called implicit indexicality, loose or loosened use, enriched interpretations, or semantic transfer, not metaphor itself. In the first half of the paper, I critically evaluate Recanati’s (2004) recent Contextualist account and show that it cannot account (...) for the metaphorical‐literal dependence characteristic of metaphor. I then turn to Carston’s (2002), and Bezuidenhout’s (2001) Contextualist accounts and show that they place no constraints on metaphorical interpretations. In the second half of the paper I sketch a Literalist theory of metaphor elaborated in Stern (2000) and respond to two kinds of Contextualist criticisms of that account by Camp (2005) and Stanley (2005). (shrink)

A new axiomatic treatment of equilibrium thermodynamics—thermostatics—is presented. The equilibrium states of a thermal system are assumed to be represented by a differentiable manifold of dimensionn + 1 (n finite). The empirical temperature is defined by the notion of thermal equilibrium. Empirical entropy is shown to exist for all systems with the property that the total work delivered along closed adiabats is zero. Absolute entropy and temperature follow from the additivity of heat and energy for two separate systems in thermal (...) equilibrium considered as a whole. The absolute temperature is defined up to a multiplicative constant. The exterior differentiable calculus of Cartan is introduced and in a subsequent paper its use for the derivation of standard results in thermostatics will be explained. (shrink)

A method is presented for deciding whether correct predictions about other people are based on simulation or theory use. The differentiating power of this method was assessed with cognitive estimation biases (e.g. estimating the area of Brazil) in two variations. Experiments 1 and 2 operated with the influence of response scales of different length. Experiment 3 used the difference between free estimates that tended to be far off the true value and estimates constrained by an appropriate response scale, where estimates (...) became greatly more realistic. The critical question is how well observer subjects can predict these target biases under two different presentation conditions. Response scale biases (Experiments 1 and 2) were more strongly predicted when observer subjects were presented with the two scales juxtaposed, than when responses for each scale were given independently. This speaks for the use of a theory, since simulation should, if there is any difference at all, be made more difficult by the juxtaposition of conditions. The difference between free and constrained estimations (Experiment 3) was more strongly predicted under independent than under juxtaposed presentation. This speaks for the use of simulation since use of a theory should, if anything, be helped by juxtaposition of problems since it helps highlight the theoretically relevant factor. Results are discussed in view of recent proposals about when simulation is likely to be used, i.e. for belief fixation but not action prediction (Stich and Nichols, 1995b), for content fixation (Heal, 1996a), and for rational effects only (Heal, 1996b). (shrink)

Ponto de partida para a discussãdo do problema do mal entre os autores do Idealismo Alemão é a ideia de Kant acerca do "mal radical". Kant usou este termo para designer a falsificação da liberdade humana. Com efeito, e apesar de a liberdade ser inerente ao ser humano, este carrega sempre consigo a responsabilidade que Ihe corresponde, pois de outra forma não faria qualquer sentidofalar de apelos morals ã mudança Fichte procurou determinor de forma mãs precisa afonte deste "mal radical" (...) no ser humano, identificando-o na letargia ou inercia inerente ao ser humano. Com efeito, é na resistência da natureza sensual do ser humano a toda a actividade intelectual ou espiritual que reside a constante tentacdo de ndo assumir o chamamento para a acção associado com o imperativo categórico. Schelling, por seu lado, encara o problema do mal em conexdo com uma teoria acerca de Deus da Criação. Segundo ele, o ser humano está ainda em processo de devir aquilo mesmo que ele é suposto ser, de onde deriva a sua auto-referencialidade, ou auto-fechamento, as quais no amor de Deus estão já eternamente superadas, mas que no ser humano constituem o da sua "vontade particular". Devido ao temor de perder o seu ser mais próprio (simesmo), o ser humano revela-se incapaz de se auto-transcender e de abdicar dessa "vonta de particular" em favor da "Vontade Universal", como aliás é seu dever. Ora é neste conflito que consiste o drama da Criação, conflito este em que o próprio Deus se permite entrar, já que não ofazer significaria a capitulação do bem em relação ao mal. Para Hegel, finalmente, o problema do mal tern a vercom o problema da independência do espírito. Esta independencia constitui, de facto, a verdadeira determinação do ser humano. Mas isso no preciso momento em que se dá o encontro do ser humano consigo mesmo e o seu vir-a-si-mesmo (Sich-Finden und Zusichkommen), jé que este é o momento em que o ser humano de forma mais completapode efectivamentefalhar o seu alvo. Para Hegel, portanto, é precisament "consciência "- esse espaço em que sed dá maior autonomia e independência do ser humano - onde se verifica o maior perigo de um descaminho para o mal, ou seja, para o mais completo auto-isolamento. A capacidade reflexiva e de auto-relacionamento revela-se dessa forma, uma forqa ambivalente: por um lado, constitui potencial para um auto--fechamento do ser humano na sua propria singularidade; por outro, representa um potencial de ser abertura de si-mesma em ordem a uma integracdo da sua propria singularidade Universal mais elevado. /// German Idealism's discussion of the problem of evil takes Kant's idea of "radical evil" as its departure point. Kant had used this term to designate a falsification of human freedom. Though freedom is inherent in the human being, the human being bears a responsibility for it at the same time; otherwise a moral appeal to change one's ways would have no point. Fichte sought to determine more precisely the source of this "radical evil" in the human being and found it in the human being's inherent lethargy or inertia. In this resistance of the human being's sensual nature to intellectual/spiritual activity lies the constant temptation not to take up the call to action which the categorical imperative demands. Schelling takes up the problem of evil in connection with a theory on God and Creation. The human being is still becoming that which he is meant to be, and thus the self-referentiality, or self-enclosedness, which in God's divine love are already eternally overcome, constitutes in the human being the very power of his particular will". Out of fear of losing his very self the human being is unable to go beyond himself and surrender that particular will" to the "Universal Will" as he should. In this conflict consists the drama of the Creation, a conflict which God allows himself to enter, for not to do so would mean the capitulation of good to evil. For Hegel, the problem of evil is a problem of the independence of the spirit. This independence constitutes indeed the true determination of the human being, but exactly at the very moment of the human being's finding-of-self and coming-into-himself (Sich-Finden undZusichkommen) the human being can completely miss the mark. Thus for Hegel it is precisely the conscience "-that site of greatest human autonomy and independence -which is in danger of veering off into evil, i. e., into utter self-isolation. The capacity for reflection and for self-relationship thus reveals itself as an ambivalent force: in its potential for fatal self-closing-off in its own singularity on the one hand, and in it potential for self-opening and integration of its own singularity into the higher Universal on the other. (shrink)

This essay develops Slavoj Žižek’s critique of Quentin Meillassoux’s speculative materialism. The first part consists of a discussion of Meillassoux’s ‘principle of factiality’ (which states that only contingency is necessary) and Ray Brassier’s problematization of this principle’s self-referentiality. The second part takes up Žižek’s critique of Meillassoux, which solves the problem of self-reference by dialecticizing the principle of factiality, ending up with the thesis of the contingency of necessity. The third part is an elaboration of Žižek’s critique in which the (...) main lacuna in Meillassoux’s philosophy, i.e. the lack of any account of the genesis of subjectivity, is seen to lead to a disavowal of ‘constitutive mythology’ as theorized by Markus Gabriel. It is argued that Meillassoux’s notion of ‘hyper-Chaos’ is in fact the core of his mythology, which becomes especially clear when contrasted with an alternative mythology, namely Henri Bergson’s vision of ‘creative evolution’. Finally, it is shown how Žižek’s critique of Meillassoux gravitates toward this mythology of creative evolution as his Lacanian version of dialectical materialism is reformulated in the light of the speculative realist problematic. (shrink)

This paper examines the place of metaphorical interpretation in the current Contextualist-Literalist controversy over the role of context in the determination of truth-conditions in general. Although there has been considerable discussion of 'non-literal' language by both sides of this dispute, the language analyzed involves either so-called implicit indexicality, loose or loosened use, enriched interpretations, or semantic transfer, not metaphor itself. In the first half of the paper, I critically evaluate Recanati's (2004) recent Contextualist account and show that it cannot account (...) for the metaphorical-literal dependence characteristic of metaphor. I then turn to Carston's (2002), and Bezuidenhout's (2001) Contextualist accounts and show that they place no constraints on metaphorical interpretations. In the second half of the paper I sketch a Literalist theory of metaphor elaborated in Stern (2000) and respond to two kinds of Contextualist criticisms of that account by Camp (2005) and Stanley (2005). (shrink)

This paper argues first that, contrary to what one would expect, metaphorical interpretations of utterances pass two of Cappelan and Lepore's Minimalist tests for semantic context-sensitivity. I then propose how, in light of that result, one might analyze metaphors on the model of indexicals and demonstratives, expressions that (even) Minimalists agree are semantically context-dependent. This analysis builds on David Kaplan's semantics for demonstratives and refines an earlier proposal in (Stern, Metaphor in context, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000). In the course of (...) this argument, I also discuss some new examples of linguistic phenomena that motivate a semantic structure underlying metaphorical interpretation, phenomena I argue that neither Minimalists nor Contextualists can explain. (shrink)

At the beginning there was an act of extraordinary generosity: when I first met Jeff at a legal semiotics conference in the early eighties, he approached me after my presentation of mostly half-baked ideas and wild conjectures, congratulating me on my visual displays, and enquiring if I should be interested in developing my work into a joint book project. In the portrait of the scholar as a young man or woman, this is the kind of turn of events I should (...) hope will happen for all my colleagues in the first, still insecure phases of their careers. I have had the honour and privilege of becoming a member of the Collegium Invisibile Semioticae with Jeff as the Decanus subtilis of this enterprise, special in many ways. In the abstract of my contribution to his festschrift colloquium I remarked that “The idea of the academy has to be recreated from nothing. Ex nihilo quodlibet: ad multos annos” — hoping for many more than the seven years that were to follow. In the following seven Paninian quodlibeta I have endeavoured to come to terms with the intellectual and existential appeal of economy and minimalism: fail, fail again, fail better. (shrink)

At the beginning there was an act of extraordinary generosity: when I first met Jeff at a legal semiotics conference in the early eighties, he approached me after my presentation of mostly half-baked ideas and wild conjectures, congratulating me on my visual displays, and enquiring if I should be interested in developing my work into a joint book project. In the portrait of the scholar as a young man or woman, this is the kind of turn of events I should (...) hope will happen for all my colleagues in the first, still insecure phases of their careers. I have had the honour and privilege of becoming a member of the Collegium Invisibile Semioticae with Jeff as the Decanus subtilis of this enterprise, special in many ways. In the abstract of my contribution to his festschrift colloquium I remarked that “The idea of the academy has to be recreated from nothing. Ex nihilo quodlibet: ad multos annos” — hoping for many more than the seven years that were to follow. In the following seven Paninian quodlibeta I have endeavoured to come to terms with the intellectual and existential appeal of economy and minimalism: fail, fail again, fail better. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, abstract art has formed a central stream of modern art. To attain purely aesthetic goals, many avant-garde artists turned painting in particular into a pursuit of breaking off the relations with natural forms. Instead of copying them, they have merely relied on their inner visions. When externalizing these visions directly on the canvas or sheets of paper, the practitioners of abstract art have inadvertently used the phenomenological method and its epoché. In this essay (...) I argue that the philosophies of Kupka and Husserl are largely compatible. This is not because the two use the same terminology, but because they virtually mean and do the same thing in their respective fields. Even where there are significant differences between them, these are not as great as it might at first seem. In the essay’s conclusion I sum up some of the most significant implications their compatible theories have for the philosophy of art and for various theories of art today. (shrink)

We translate Socrates’ famous saying I know that I know nothing into the arithmetical sentence I prove that I prove nothing. Then it is easy to show that this translated saying is formally undecidable in formal arithmetic, using Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. We investigate some variations of this Socrates-Gödel sentence. In an appendix we sketch a ramified epistemic logic with propositional quantifiers in order to analyze the Socrates-Gödel sentence in a more logical way, separated from the arithmetical context.

I. Logica. Philosophia naturalis.--II. Metaphysica. Ethica.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 (2002) 256-257 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De Trinitate" Johannes Brachtendorf. Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De Trinitate." Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000. Pp. viii + 335. Cloth, DM 128,00. "The Trinity" is arguably Augustine's (philosophically) most demanding work. Yet it is (...) precisely its philosophical quality that is nowadays sometimes called in question for its apparent lack of argumentative coherence. H. I. Marrou has even expressed the view that this may have been intended, as the text is designed as an exercitatioanimi, a spiritual-mental exercise; i.e., the argumentative gaps are deliberately left open to be filled in by whoever undergoes the exercise. This would mean that "The Trinity" lacks any philosophical or theological position or doctrine in particular, and that it must not be judged by the standards of philosophical discourse, even those of Augustine's own day and age. Brachtendorf sets out with a revision of that view. Augustine, he argues, does indeed formulate a particular position. The impression that there may be gaps in his arguments could well stem from a misunderstanding of some of them. Augustine, Brachtendorf reports in his first chapter (1), developed his teaching of the triune God in close contact with the philosophy of Plotinus. However, he distanced himself from Plotinus by analyzing the process of cognition not by taking as an example the divine nous, but the menshumana. Apart from that he developed an ontology of the Trinity (2) and only then analyzed the human mind in analogy to it (3-4). He also looked into the relationship of mind and language ("word") (5) and developed further some aspects of this relationship such as the trinitarian structure of the human mind (6), the relationship of knowledge and wisdom (7), the human mind as the image of God (8), the self-reflection of the human mind (9), language as an expression of that self-reflection in the image of God (10), and the concept of the "inner word" (11).Brachtendorf concludes with an appeal not to read into Augustine's link of notitia and amor that he was interested in the analysis of self-knowledge merely for ethical reasons. Amor, he argues, expressly includes operations of the intellect. Augustine's interest was therefore genuinely theoretical and intellectualist. Amor, for Augustine, was a force that creates knowledge as such, no matter what the content. Its impact is practical and theoretical. Referring to the works of Charles Taylor, Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Hannah Arendt, Brachtendorf demonstrates how influential Augustine was with this aspect of his thought in the development of "Subjekt"-centered philosophies in the twentieth century. Yet, as influential as this approach may have been in this particular field, arguing, as it did, for the ontological character of human subjectivity (i.e., that the human mind was naturally structured in a trinitarian way, but had to make its natural intelligence explicit in thought through the learning of language) it did not revolutionize [End Page 256] the understanding of language. In consequence it did not impress the philosophers of the linguistic turn, and that is probably why today the argument of "The Trinity" is so often found wanting.Pointing back to the source Brachtendorf's study is a welcome contribution to the subject and a useful guide for all who now--hopefully, and encouraged by this work--set out for themselves to have a (closer) look at the original. Josef Lössl Catholic University Leuven... (shrink)

It is well known that Maimonides rejects the Kalam argument for the existence of God because it assumes the temporal creation of the world, a premise for which he says there is no 1 By contrast, he claims to establish belief in the existence of God (I:71:182). Taken at his word, Maimonidess five ways, have traditionally been read as models of medieval natural theology: of the power of human reason to independently establish revealed truth. In recent years, however, the same (...) demonstrations have assumed a second kind of significance. For scholars, like myself, who argue that Maimonides holds severe views about the limitations of human knowledge of divine science and metaphysics, these demonstrations are the strongest conceivable counterevidence. 2 If Maimonides really held that humans cannot apprehend metaphysical truths about the deity, how could he have demonstrated (or even thought he could demonstrate) the existence of God? If he does demonstrate it, then humans evidently do have knowledge of metaphysics. As one distinguished scholar has recently protested, it is nothing less than to interpret Maimonides as 3. (shrink)

Cílem této studie je prozkoumat postavení metafory na poli zkoumání významu a následně představit potenciál metafory, a obrazných vyjádření obecně, zastávat pozici kritéria hodnocení teorií významu. Jako výchozí bod si práce bere několik vlivných pojetí metafory, na nichž ukazuje šíři bádání o metafoře a obraznosti a zároveň různorodost možných přístupů k vysvětlení těchto jazykových fenoménů. Dále je věnována pozornost několika sporným bodům opakovaně se objevujícím v různých teoriích metafory. Na základě analýzy těchto sporných bodů jsou předloženy argumenty zpochybňující předpokládanou odlišnost (...) mechanismů konstituování významu u obrazných a doslovných vyjádření. Následkem toho je pak vznesen návrh, zda by metafora, pro své kvalitativní a kvantitativní rysy, nemohla být chápána jako prubířský kámen teorií významu, tj. byla nástrojem k hodnocení těchto teorií, k jejich falsifikování, modifikování či přímo k jejich vytváření.The main aim of this study is to examine the role that metaphor plays in investigation of linguistic meaning and to present the potential of metaphor and figurative language in general to maintain a position of an evaluating criterion for theories of meaning. Several influential theories of metaphor are used as a starting point for this inquiry, to show how vast the field of investigation of metaphors and figurative language might be and how various approaches attempt to explain these language phenomena. I then focus on a number of problematic points repeatedly resurfacing in various theories of metaphor. My analysis of these problems issues in arguments questioning supposed difference between constituting mechanisms of literal and figurative meaning. Having this in place, I propose that, on account of its quantitative and qualitative features, metaphor could be understood as a touchstone of theories of meaning, i.e. the tool for their evaluating, refuting, modifying and even for creating new ones. (shrink)

Viennese Brain Research and the Formation of Austrian Positivism. In this paper, I want to argue that the Vienna School of Medicine and especially the Viennese Brain Anatomy had an impact on the formation of the Austrian positivism. I argue that Carl von Rokitansky's (1804–1878) doctrine that psychological phenomena must be translated into anatomical facts and Theodor Meynert's (1833–1892) theory of brain functions served as one basis for the formation of the Austrian positivism. In this sense, two of the main (...) early positivistic thinkers, Ernst Mach (1838–1916) and Richard Wahle (1857–1935), used Meynert's brain theory to argue for a bundle view of the Self. Friedrich Jodl (1849–1914) also thought about his theory, and even Moritz Schlick (1882–1936) who demanded a ‘reduction of the psychology to the brain physiology’ grappled with this approach. Meynert, a scholar of Rokitansky, the founder of the Vienna School of Medicine, was a leading figure in the history of neurology and has made several significant contributions to this discipline. He argues that the Self does not exist from an anatomical point of view. As Richard Wahle tells us, Meynert's theory of the brain functions was widely accepted under the brain researchers by the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. He makes clear that brain researchers did in common refer to Meynert's theory to explain psychical functions as brain functions. He says from their point of view there was no doubt about it. Mach talks about Meynert's theory in Erkenntnis und Irrtum. There he says that Meynert's brain theory explains the nature and conditions of the consciousness. Michael Hagner argues that Mach's “Das Ich ist unrettbar” is hardly imaginable without the cerebral embedding of the mental functions. (shrink)

Individualism and collectivism serve in the field of sociological theories as complementary principles of the formation of concepts and hypotheses. This paper attempts to show that the methodological forms of i. and c., as distinguished from the more ideological traditional forms, may be differentiated, according to whether they are intended as ontological, meaning-theoretical or explanation-theoretical, as well as according to whether they are presented in a more dogmatic or more qualified form. Out of the combination of these various aspects arises (...) a multiplicity of positions dissolving the traditionally accepted opposition between individualism and collectivism. (shrink)

Let X be an infinite internal set in an ω1-saturated nonstandard universe. Then for any coloring of [X] k , such that the equivalence E of having the same color is countably determined and there is no infinite internal subset of [X] k with all its elements of different colors (i.e., E is condensating on X), there exists an infinite internal set Z⊆X such that all the sets in [Z] k have the same color. This Ramsey-type result is obtained as (...) a consequence of a more general one, asserting the existence of infinite internal Q-homogeneous sets for certain Q ⊆ [[X] k ] m , with arbitrary standard k≥ 1, m≥ 2. In the course of the proof certain minimal condensating countably determined sets will be described. (shrink)

It is well known that Maimonides rejects the Kalam argument for the existence of God because it assumes the temporal creation of the world, a premise for which he says there is no “cogent demonstration (burhan qat'i) except among those who do not know the difference between demonstration, dialectics, and sophistic argument.”Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), I:71:180. All references are to this translation; parenthetic in-text references are to part, chapter, (...) and page. By contrast, he claims to establish belief in the existence of God “through a demonstrative method as to which there is no disagreement in any respect” (I:71:182). Taken at his word, Maimonides’ proofs for the existence of the deity, like Aquinas’s five ways, have traditionally been read as models of medieval natural theology: of the power of human reason to independently establish revealed truth. In recent years, however, the same demonstrations have assumed a second kind of significance. For scholars, like myself, who argue that Maimonides holds severe views about the limitations of human knowledge of divine science and metaphysics, these demonstrations are the strongest conceivable counterevidence.The locus classicus for this view is Shlomo Pines, “The Limitations of Human Knowledge According to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. I Twersky, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), I:82–109. See also his “Les Limites de la Métaphysique selon Al-Farabi, ibn Bajja et Maimonide; Sources et Antitheses de ces Doctrines chez Alexandre d’Aphrodise et Chez Themistius,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13 (1981): 211–25; “Dieu et L’Etre Selon Maimonide: Exégese d’Exode 3,14 et doctrine connexe,” in Celui qui est: Interprétations juives et chrétiennes d’Exode 3, 14, ed. A. de Libera et E. Zum Brunn (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf [Collection “Patrimoines”], 1986), 15–24; and “The Relation between Maimonides’ Halakhic and non-Halakhic Works,” in Maimonides and Philosophy, ed., S. Pines and Y. Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). Pines concludes, on the basis of the limitations of the intellect with respect to knowledge of metaphysics, that Maimonides, like Kant, gives priority to the practical over the theoretical. For arguments drawing different ‘skeptical’ conclusions, see my “Maimonides in the Skeptical Tradition,” ms.; “Maimonides on the Growth of Knowledge and the Limitations of the Intellect,” to appear in Tony Levy, ed., Maimonide: Traditions philosophiques et scientifiques médievales arabe, hébraique, latine; “Logical Syntax as a Key to a Secret of the Guide of the Perplexed,” (in Heb.), Iyyun 38 (1989): 137–66; “Maimonides on Language and the Science of Language,” in Maimonides and the Sciences, ed., H. Levine and R. Cohen (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), pp. 173–226; and The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide (forthcoming). If Maimonides really held that humans cannot apprehend metaphysical truths about the deity, how could he have demonstrated (or even thought he could demonstrate) the existence of God? If he does demonstrate it, then humans evidently do have knowledge of metaphysics. As one distinguished scholar has recently protested, it is nothing less than “perverse” to interpret Maimonides as “meaning that the existence of God is unknowable when he in fact prides himself on having demonstrated the existence of God in four different ways.”Herbert A. Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge,” Maimonidean Studies 3 (1992–1993): 49–103, 86. See also Alfred L. Ivry, “The Logical and Scientific Premises of Maimonides’ Thought,” in Perspectives on Jewish Thought and Mysticism, ed. Alfred L. Ivry, Elliot R. Wolfson, and Allan Arkush (Amsterdam: Harwood Publishers, 1998), pp. 63–97, 70. (shrink)

In a classic paper, Leon Roth asked »Is there a Jewish Philosophy?« to which he replied No. In this paper, focusing on the case of Medieval Jewish Philosophy, I argue, first, that we cannot characterize Jewish philosophy in terms of the identity, religious or secular, of its philosophers, in terms of a language in which it was written or conducted, in terms of a particular style or school, or in terms of content: as philosophy specifically of Judaism the religion. I (...) then go on to argue that all the medieval Jewish philosophers were doing was Philosophy, although I sketch two different conceptions of what a philosophical interpretation of Judaism and the Jews might be: a Saadyanic model and Maimonides’. However, even though there is no kind of philosophy called »Jewish philosophy« as opposed to simply »Philosophy,« I argue that we can identify (medieval) Jewish philosophy as a philosophical »tradition,« a causally related sequence of philosophers who influence and are influenced by each other and who engage in a distinguishable dialogue or conversation among themselves. In the last part of the paper, I critically discuss various recent arguments that purport to show that there is something paradoxical, self-contradictory, and philosophically illegitimate about the very idea of a Jewish philosophy. (shrink)

The question ‘What is death?’ is by no means exclusively or primarily a question of medical science. It is, in the last analysis, a philosophical question. The philosopher’s role in the discussion of death is twofold: On the one hand, he has to explore those highly intelligible and essentially necessary aspects of death which no other human science investigates. This task includes a phenomenology of life and death, an ontology and metaphysics, as well as a philosophical anthropology of death. It (...) likewise includes an analysis of the language of death and life and of the logical structure of the arguments used in the debates about life and death. On the other hand the philosopher has to warn representatives of other disciplines against concluding too much from the little they know and extending their methods to areas where they are not appropriate. Careful reflection on both philosophical knowledge and philosophical ignorance concerning death shows, I shall argue, that the definition of death in terms of ‘brain death’ ought to be rejected. (shrink)

Lemovo dílo Dokonalá prázdnota je sbírkou recenzí fiktivních autorů na neexistující vědecké práce. Patří sem i přednáška Alfreda Testy proslovená u příležitosti udělení Nobelovy ceny za fyziku. Je to vlastně rekapitulace kosmologického konceptu postaveného na objevu pozapomenuté myšlenky Aristida Acheropoula, která má vysvětlit silentium universi. Proč vesmír mlčí? Proč nám nikdo neodpovídá na naše výzvy posílané do mezihvězdných dálek? Proč je naše pátrání po mimozemských civilizacích neúspěšné? Testa ve své přednášce před posluchače postupně vrství fundamentální otázky vztahu matematiky a fyziky, (...) intertpretaci posledních objevů moderní kosmologie, vysvětlení fyzikálních zákonitostí teorie relativity a kvantové mechaniky včetně metafyzické otázky proč jsou právě takové. Protože Lem staví před čtenáře příběh vědeckého objevu, nabízí se možnost, vzít je zcela vážně nikoli jako fiction, ale jako science a podívat se na jeho jednotlivé komponenty očima soudobé vědy. (shrink)

Autoři chtějí svou populární prací vzbudit zájem o hlubší studium filosofie. Dokazují její význam pro praxi světového revolučního hnutí i pro život jednotlivce. Látku rozvrhli na podrobné otázky, např. co je filosofie, čím se zabývá, jak poznáváme svět, jak si ověřujeme pravdivost našeho poznání, jak je rozvíjí práce, jaká je jeho třídní podmíněnost, co je hmota, co je lidská společnost, co je vědomí, jaké je metafyzické a jaké dialektické chápání světa, co je vývoj, jak chápat jednotu a boj protikladů, jaký (...) je význam filosofie a co v ní přinesl marxismus. (shrink)

The question ‘What is death?’ is by no means exclusively or primarily a question of medical science. It is, in the last analysis, a philosophical question. The philosopher’s role in the discussion of death is twofold: On the one hand, he has to explore those highly intelligible and essentially necessary aspects of death which no other human science investigates. This task includes a phenomenology of life and death, an ontology and metaphysics, as well as a philosophical anthropology of death. It (...) likewise includes an analysis of the language of death and life and of the logical structure of the arguments used in the debates about life and death. On the other hand the philosopher has to warn representatives of other disciplines against concluding too much from the little they know and extending their methods to areas where they are not appropriate. Careful reflection on both philosophical knowledge and philosophical ignorance concerning death shows, I shall argue, that the definition of death in terms of ‘brain death’ ought to be rejected. (shrink)